Real Property by Nurenberg, Marshall I.
Case Western Reserve Law Review




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Marshall I. Nurenberg, Real Property, 5 W. Res. L. Rev. 296 (1954)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol5/iss3/28
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
REAL PROPERTY
Deeds
The grantor handed to his son a deed which preserved a life estate in
the grantor with a vested remainder in fee simple to the son. The son then
handed the deed back to the grantor, his father, for safekeeping. During the
grantor's life he conveyed away small portions of the tract in fee simple and
an easement for highway purposes with -the apparent knowledge and con-
sent of the remainderman, who did not join in these conveyances. The
court of appeals' reversed the probate court and held that there had been a
legal delivery of a valid deed to the son during the life of the grantor. The
possession of the deed and tract by the grantor was consistent with his life
estate. The subsequent conveyances of small portions of a large tract are
insufficient to show a revocation of the delivery. Quaere -is there not
now a cloud on the tide of the subsequent grantees?
Recording
In Bach v. Ohto Fuel Gas Co.,' the Ohio Supreme Court held that a grant
of oil and gas rights in warranty deed form is properly recorded with leases.
The court observed that the document was not a lease since it was a grant in
perpetuity, in deed form, and contained no reservation for rent. But Ohio
law does not recognize an estate in oil and gas in the realty, but merely the
right of the estate holder to extract them.3 The conveyance therefore con-
stituted a license and was therefore properly recorded under the lease sec-
tion.4
Dedication
A good review of the principles of dedication is contained in the com-
mon pleas opinion of Carter v. Swan.5 The court held that a deed of a one
acre tract "for the public use " establishes that the general public is the
intended dedicatee. An offer of dedication may be accepted by the general
public and thereupon be binding even though not accepted by a body
politic.6 The evidence did not establish an abandonment by the public of
its rights by non user.
The court of appeals' held that the legislative powers granted the di-
1?; re McKittericks Estate, 94 Ohio App. 373, 115 N.E.2d 163 (1953)
2 160 Ohio St. 81, 113 N.E.2d 865 (1953)
'Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317, 49 N.E. 399 (1897); 24 AM. JtuR. 520.
'OHIO REV. CODE § 5301.09 (OHio GEN. CODE § 8518)
114 N.E.2d 107 (Summit Com. P1. 1953)
'Scott v. Snyder, 73 Ohio App. 424, 54 N.E.2d 157 (1943)
'Kubin v. Reineck, 93 Ohio App. 320, 113 N.E.2d 914 (1952)
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rector of highways authorize him to cut fruit and shade trees to provide fa-
cility and travel and efficient enjoyment of the highway system.8 This
duty can be delegated by the director to a third party. Such third party
will not then be liable in trespass. In the present case this authority was
applied to the land contiguous with the paved roadway, but within the
highway dedication.
Water Rights
In Ratcliffe v. Indian Hill Acres,9 the court of appeals held that the
mere fact that water may be rendered unfit for many uses for which it had
been suitable before is not a basis for a damage action. There is no liability
in damages when a riparian owner uses the stream in a reasonable manner
consistent with the common right." The opinion also noted that the de-
posits of mud and weed seed on the plaintiffs' land complained of were the
result of a stopping or slowing up of the natural flow of the stream by the
plaintiffs to create an artificial pond. The plaintiffs cannot complain of
damages resulting from their own act.
In Conobre v. Frtsch,"x the court of appeals held that the overflow of
a spring running in a definite channel encased in tile pipe is a natural water-
course. The adjoining landowners therefore have only riparian and not ex-
clusive rights. The court noted that the purpose of the tile was to cover an
otherwise open watercourse as an aid in cultivation. The defendant was
enjoined from diverting the water to his exclusive use although the spring
was on his land.
Torrens Act
In Bepler v. Reardon,1 2 the defendant surrendered a certificate of title
and demanded that it be deregistered. 13 The recorder obtained an order from
the court of common pleas not to accept this surrender.1 From an appeal
of this order, the court of appeals held that the code provisions for deregis-
tration were intended only to give the holder of title by virtue of proceedings
instituted to register and partition and certain other specified proceedings 5
the option of deciding whether he desires a registered or unregistered title
to land already registered. Otherwise the special provision for deregistra-
tion would be in conflict with Ohio Revised Code Section 5309.90 (Ohio
General Code Section 8572-86).
8 OHio REv. CODE § 5501.11 (OHIO GEN. CODE § 1178-2).
'93 Ohio App. 231, 113 NXE.2d 30 (1952).
1056 AM. JUR. 833.
=92 Ohio App. 520, 111 N.E.2d 38 (1952).
'92 Ohio App. 70, 109 N.E.2d 686 (1952).
' Omo REv. CODE § 5309.68 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 8572-64a)
1 4OHo REV. CODE § 5309.43 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 8572-40)
Omo RaV. CODE § 5309.66 (OmIo GEN. CODE § 8572-64).
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